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Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff
Queries
John Fearnley, University of Liverpool
Rahul Savani, University of Liverpool
We study the deterministic and randomized query complexity of finding approximate equilibria in bima-
trix games. We show that the deterministic query complexity of finding an ǫ-Nash equilibrium when ǫ < 1
2
is Ω(k2), even in zero-one constant-sum games. In combination with previous results [Fearnley et al. 2013],
this provides a complete characterization of the deterministic query complexity of approximate Nash equilib-
ria. We also study randomized querying algorithms.We give a randomized algorithm for finding a ( 3−
√
5
2
+ǫ)-
Nash equilibrium using O(k·log k
ǫ2
) payoff queries, which shows that the 1
2
barrier for deterministic algo-
rithms can be broken by randomization. For well-supported Nash equilibria (WSNE), we first give a ran-
domized algorithm for finding an ǫ-WSNE of a zero-sum bimatrix game using O(k·log k
ǫ4
) payoff queries,
and we then use this to obtain a randomized algorithm for finding a ( 2
3
+ ǫ)-WSNE in a general bimatrix
game using O(k·log k
ǫ4
) payoff queries. Finally, we initiate the study of lower bounds against randomized
algorithms in the context of bimatrix games, by showing that randomized algorithms require Ω(k2) payoff
queries in order to find a 1
6k
-Nash equilibrium, even in zero-one constant-sum games. In particular, this
rules out query-efficient randomized algorithms for finding exact Nash equilibria.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: Nonnu-
merical Algorithms and Problems—Computations on discrete structures.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Payoff query complexity, bimatrix game, approximate Nash equilibrium,
randomized algorithms.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in game theory, which
makes algorithms for finding Nash equilibria an important topic. A recent strand
of work [Babichenko 2014; Babichenko and Barman 2013; Fearnley et al. 2013;
Goldberg and Roth 2013; Hart and Nisan 2013] has studied this problem from the per-
spective of payoff query complexity.
The payoff query model is motivated by practical applications of game theory. In
many practical applications it is often the case that we know that there is a game to be
solved, but we do not know what the payoffs are. In order to discover the payoffs, we
would have to play the game, and hence discover the payoffs through experimentation.
This may be quite costly, so it is natural to ask whether we can find a Nash equilibrium
of a game while minimising the number of experiments that we must perform.
Payoff queries model this situation. In the payoff query model we are told the struc-
ture of the game, ie. the strategy space, but we are not told the payoffs. We are per-
mitted to make payoff queries, where we propose a pure strategy profile, and we are
told the payoff to each player under that strategy profile. Our task is to compute an
equilibrium of the game while minimising the number of payoff queries that we make.
This paper studies the payoff query complexity of finding equilibria in bimatrix
games. Previous work has shown that the deterministic query complexity of finding
an exact Nash equilibrium in a k × k bimatrix game is k2, even for zero-one constant-
sum games [Fearnley et al. 2013]. In other words, one cannot hope to find an exact
Nash equilibrium without querying all pure strategy profiles. Since query-efficient al-
gorithms for exact equilibria do not exist, this naturally raises the question: what is
the payoff query complexity of finding approximate equilibria?
This work is supported by EPSRC grant EP/H046623/1 “Synthesis and Verification in Markov Game Struc-
tures” and EPSRC grant EP/L011018/1 “Algorithms for Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria.”
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There are two competing notions of approximate equilibrium for bimatrix games.
An exact Nash equilibrium requires that all players achieve their best-response payoff,
and thus have no incentive to deviate. An ǫ-Nash equilibrium requires that each player
receives a payoff that is within ǫ of their best-response payoff, and thus all players
have only a small incentive to deviate. One problem with this definition is that an ǫ-
Nash equilibrium permits a player to place a small amount of probability on a very
bad strategy, and it is questionable whether a rational player would actually want to
do this. An ǫ-well supported Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE) rectifies this, by requiring
that all players only place probability on strategies that are within ǫ of being a best-
response.
Previous work by Fearnley, Gairing, Goldberg, and Savani [Fearnley et al. 2013] has
shown that an algorithm of Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [Daskalakis et al.
2009] can be adapted to produce a deterministic algorithm that finds a 12 -Nash equi-
librium using 2k − 1 payoff queries. The same paper also shows that, for all i in the
range 2 ≤ i < k, the deterministic payoff query complexity of finding a (1 − 1
i
)-Nash
equilibrium is at least k − i + 1. Note, in particular, that this implies that for every
constant ǫ in the range 12 ≤ ǫ < 1, the deterministic query complexity of finding an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium is Θ(k).
However, relatively little is known about the more interesting case of ǫ < 12 . A
lower bound of Ω(k · log k) has been shown against deterministic algorithms that find
a O( 1log k )-Nash equilibrium [Fearnley et al. 2013]. For the special case of zero-sum
games, Goldberg and Roth have shown that an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum bi-
matrix game can be found by a randomized algorithm that uses O(k·log k
ǫ2
)many payoff
queries [Goldberg and Roth 2013].
Our contribution. As we have mentioned, so far relatively little is known for the de-
terministic query complexity of finding an ǫ-Nash equilibrium when ǫ < 12 . We address
this with a lower bound: in Section 3 we show that, for every ǫ > 0, the deterministic
payoff query complexity of finding a (12−ǫ)-Nash equilibrium in a k×k bimatrix game is
Ω(k2). Our lower bound holds even for zero-one constant-sum games. When combined
with previous results, this provides a complete characterization of the deterministic
query complexity of ǫ-Nash equilibria when ǫ is constant: it is Θ(k) for ǫ ≥ 12 , and Θ(k
2)
for ǫ < 12 .
Since our lower bound rules out deterministic query-efficient algorithms for find-
ing (12 − ǫ)-Nash equilibria, it is natural to ask whether this threshold can be
broken through the use of randomization. In Section 6 we give a positive an-
swer to this question. Our approach is to take an algorithm of Bosse, Byrka, and
Markakis [Bosse et al. 2010], and to apply the randomized algorithm of Goldberg and
Roth [Goldberg and Roth 2013] in order to solve the zero-sum game used by the BBM
algorithm. We show that this produces a randomized algorithm that uses O(k·log k
ǫ2
)
payoff queries and finds a (3−
√
5
2 + ǫ)-Nash equilibrium in a k× k bimatrix game. Since
3−√5
2 ≈ 0.382, this shows that randomization can be used to defeat the barrier at 0.5
that exists for deterministic algorithms.
In Section 7, we turn our attention to approximate well-supported Nash equilibria,
which is a topic that has not previously been studied from the payoff query perspective
in the context of bimatrix games. We adapt the algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis
for finding a 23 -WSNE in a bimatrix game [Kontogiannis and Spirakis 2010], and in
doing so we obtain a randomized algorithm for finding a (23 + ǫ)-WSNE using O(
k·log k
ǫ4
)
many payoff queries. Note that this almost matches the best known polynomial-time
algorithm for finding approximate well-supported Nash equilibria: Fearnley, Goldberg,
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Savani, and Sørensen [Fearnley et al. 2012] have given a polynomial time algorithm
that finds a (23 − 0.004735)-WSNE.
As part of the proof of this result, we prove an interesting side result: there is a ran-
domized algorithm that finds an ǫ-WSNE of a zero-sum game using O(k·log k
ǫ4
) payoff
queries. This complements the result of Goldberg and Roth for finding ǫ-Nash equilib-
ria in zero-sum games, and potentially could find applications elsewhere.
Finally, we initiate the study of lower bounds against randomized algorithms in the
context of bimatrix games. In Section 4 we show that the randomized query complexity
of finding a 16k -Nash equilibrium in a k × k bimatrix game is Ω(k
2). Again, our lower
bound holds even for zero-one constant-sum games. Note, in particular, that our lower
bound rules out the existence of query-efficient randomized algorithms for finding ex-
act equilibria. This improves over earlier results, which only considered deterministic
algorithms for finding exact Nash equilibria [Fearnley et al. 2013].
Related work. Apart from the related work on bimatrix games that we have al-
ready mentioned, there have been a number of results on payoff query complexity
in the context of n-player strategic form games. Recently, Babichenko has shown that
there is a constant (but small) ǫ for which the randomized query complexity of find-
ing an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium in an n-player strategic form is exponential
in n [Babichenko 2014].
The query complexity of finding approximate-correlated equilibria has been studied
in a pair of papers [Babichenko and Barman 2013; Hart and Nisan 2013], where it
was shown that a randomized algorithm can find approximate-correlated equilibria in
polynomial time, but that non-random algorithms require exponentially many queries,
and that finding an exact equilibrium requires exponentially many queries.
Finally, Goldberg and Roth have given a randomized algorithm that uses loga-
rithmically many payoff queries in order to find approximate correlated equilibria
in binary-action n-player strategic form games, and they also give a matching lower
bound [Goldberg and Roth 2013]. The same paper shows a linear lower bound for find-
ing well-supported approximate correlated Nash equilibria.
Of course, there has beenmuch previouswork studying approximate Nash equilibria
from the computational complexity point of view [Bosse et al. 2010; Daskalakis et al.
2007, 2009; Kontogiannis et al. 2009; Tsaknakis and Spirakis 2008], some of which
we have drawn upon for our query complexity results. So far, the best polynomial-
time algorithm for finding ǫ-Nash equilibria was given by Tsaknakis and Spi-
rakis, who showed that a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium can be found in polynomial-
time [Tsaknakis and Spirakis 2008]. For well-supported approximate Nash equilib-
ria, the first result on the subject gave an algorithm for finding a 56 -WSNE in
polynomial time [Daskalakis et al. 2009], but this only holds if a certain unproved
graph-theoretic conjecture is true. The best result until recently was by Kontogian-
nis and Spirakis, who gave an algorithm for finding 23 -WSNE in polynomial time.
The current best known algorithm was given by Fearnley, Goldberg, Savani, and
Sørensen [Fearnley et al. 2012] who, in a slight improvement over previous work, pro-
duced a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a (23 − 0.004735)-WSNE.
There has also been a line of work studying the support size requirements for ap-
proximate Nash equilibria. It has been shown that every game has a 12 -Nash equilib-
rium with support size 2 [Daskalakis et al. 2009], but logarithmic support sizes are
both necessary [Feder et al. 2007] and sufficient [Altho¨fer 1994; Lipton et al. 2003] for
ǫ-Nash equilibria with ǫ < 12 . The threshold of
1
2 , of course, also appears in our work
on the deterministic query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria.
A similar support-size threshold may exist for well-supported Nash equilibria at
2
3 : it has been shown that ǫ-WSNE with ǫ <
2
3 require super-constant support
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sizes [Anbalagan et al. 2013], whereas an as yet unproved graph theoretic conjecture
would imply that every game has a 23 -WSNE with support size 3 [Daskalakis et al.
2009].
2. PRELIMINARIES
Games and Strategies. A k × k bimatrix game is a pair (R,C) of two k × k matrices:
R gives payoffs for the row player, and C gives payoffs for the column player. We make
the standard assumption that all payoffs lie in the range [0, 1]. For each n ∈ N, we use
[n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each player has k pure strategies. To play the game,
both players simultaneously select a pure strategy: the row player selects a row i ∈ [k],
and the column player selects a column j ∈ [k]. The row player then receives payoff
Ri,j , and the column player receives payoff Ci,j . We say that a bimatrix game (R,C)
is a zero-one game, if all entries of R and C are either 0 or 1. We say that (R,C) is
constant-sum if there is a constant c such that Ri,j + Ci,j = c, for all i, j ∈ [k].
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over [k]. We denote a mixed strategy
for the row player as a row vector x of length k, such that xi is the probability that
the row player assigns to pure strategy i. A mixed strategy of the column player is a
column vector y of length k, with the same interpretation. Given a mixed strategy x
for either player, the support of x, denoted Supp(x), is the set of pure strategies i with
xi > 0. If x and y are mixed strategies for the row and column player, respectively,
then we call (x,y) a mixed strategy profile.
Solution Concepts. Let (x,y) be a mixed strategy profile in a k × k bimatrix game
(R,C). We say that a row i ∈ [k] is a best response for the row player if Ri · y =
maxj∈[k] Rj · y. We say that a column i ∈ [k] is a best response for the column player
if (x · C)i = maxj∈[k](x · C)j . We define the regret suffered by the row player to be the
difference between the payoff that the row player obtains under (x,y), and the payoff
of a best response. More formally, the row player’s regret is maxj∈[k](Rj · y) − x · R · y.
Similarly, the column player’s regret is defined to be maxj∈[k]((x · C)j) − x · C · y. The
mixed strategy profile (x,y) is a mixed Nash equilibrium if both players have regret 0
under (x,y). Note that this is equivalent to saying that every pure strategy in Supp(x)
is a best response against y, and every pure strategy in Supp(y) is a best response
against x.
The two approximate solution concepts that we study in this paper both weaken the
requirements of a mixed Nash equilibrium, but in different ways. An ǫ-Nash equilib-
rium is an approximate solution concept that weakens the regret based definition of
a mixed Nash equilibrium. For every ǫ ∈ [0, 1], a mixed strategy profile (x,y) is an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium if both player suffer regret at most ǫ under (x,y).
An ǫ-well supported Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE) weakens the best-response defini-
tion of a mixed Nash equilibrium. A strategy i ∈ [k] is an ǫ-best response against y
if:
Ri · y ≥ max
j∈[k]
(Rj · y) − ǫ.
Similarly, a strategy j ∈ [k] is an ǫ-best response against x if:
(x · C)j ≥ max
j∈[k]
((x · C)j)− ǫ.
For every ǫ ∈ [0, 1], a mixed strategy profile (x,y) is an ǫ-WSNE if every pure strategy
in Supp(x) is an ǫ-best response against y, and every pure strategy in Supp(y) is an
ǫ-best response against x. Note that every ǫ-WSNE is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, but that
the converse does not hold.
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Payoff Queries. In the payoff query model, an algorithm initially only knows the size
of the game, but does not know the payoffs. That is, the algorithm knows that (R,C)
is a k × k bimatrix game, but it does not know any of the payoffs in R or C. In order to
discover the payoffs, the algorithm must make payoff queries. A payoff query is a pair
(i, j) where i ∈ [k] is a pure strategy of the row player, and j ∈ [k] is a pure strategy
of the column player. When an algorithm makes a payoff query (i, j), it receives a pair
(a, b) where a = Ri,j is the row player payoff and b = Ci,j is the column player payoff.
3. AN Ω(k2) LOWER BOUND AGAINST DETERMINISTIC ALGORITHMS FOR FINDING
( 1
2
− ǫ)-NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we show that for every ǫ > 0, no deterministic algorithm can find a
(12 − ǫ)-Nash equilibrium in a k × k bimatrix with fewer than
ǫ
2 · k
2 queries. Thus, we
show that the deterministic query complexity of finding a (12 − ǫ)-Nash equilibrium is
Ω(k2) for all ǫ > 0. This lower bound holds even for zero-one constant-sum games.
Our proof will take the form of an algorithm interacting with an adversary, who will
respond to the payoff queries that are made by the algorithm. The fundamental idea
behind our lower bound is that the adversary will hide a column c such that Ci,c = 1
for all i ∈ [k]. Thus, column c always has payoff 1 for the column player, no matter what
strategy the row player is using. Our goal is to show that the column player must place
a significant amount of probability on c in order to be in a (12 − ǫ)-Nash equilibrium.
We now define our adversary strategy. For each payoff query (i, j), we respond ac-
cording to the following rules:
— If column j has received fewer than ǫ · k payoff queries, then we respond with (0, 1).
— If column j has received at least ǫ · k payoff queries, then we respond with (1, 0).
The result of the interaction between the algorithm and the adversary is a partial
bimatrix game, which is a bimatrix game (R,C) where Ri,j and Ci,j are defined only
for the pairs (i, j) that have received a payoff query.
The idea behind this strategy is that, if an algorithm makes fewer than ǫ · k payoff
queries in a column j, then it cannot rule out the possibility that j is the hidden col-
umn c. Crucially, if an algorithm makes fewer than ǫ2 · k
2 payoff queries overall, then
there will be at least k2 columns that receive fewer than ǫ · k payoff queries, and thus,
there will be at least k2 possible candidates for the hidden column.
So, suppose that our algorithm made fewer than ǫ2 · k
2 payoff queries and then pro-
duced a mixed strategy profile (x,y). Let (R′, C′) be the resulting partial bimatrix
game. We will extend (R′, C′) to a fully defined bimatrix game (R,C) as follows:
—We first place the hidden column. To do so, we pick a column c with yc <
2
k
, such that
c has received fewer than ǫ · k payoff queries. Since at least k2 columns received fewer
than ǫ · k payoff queries, such a column is guaranteed to exist. We set Ri,c = 0 and
Ci,c = 1 for all i ∈ [k].
—For each column j 6= c, we set all unqueried elements of j to be (1, 0). More formally,
for each column j 6= c and each i ∈ [k], we set
Ri,j =
{
R′i,j if R
′
i,j is defined.
1 otherwise,
and we set Ci,j = 1−Ri,j .
Note that (R,C) is a zero-one constant-sum bimatrix game. The mixed strategy profile
(x,y) and the bimatrix game (R,C) will be fixed for the rest of this section. Observe
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that, by construction, we have ensured that y plays c with low probability. We will
exploit this to show that (x,y) is not a (12 − ǫ)-Nash equilibrium in (R,C).
In our first lemma, we give a lower bound on the row player’s best response payoff
against y.
LEMMA 3.1. The row player’s best response payoff against y in (R,C) is at least
1− ǫ− 2
k
.
PROOF. Consider a strategy x′ that mixes uniformly over all rows. Let j be a column
such that j 6= c. By definition, we have that there are at most ǫ·k rows i in j that satisfy
Ci,j = 1, and there are at least k− ǫ · k rows i in j that satisfy Ci,j = 0. Therefore, since
x
′ plays each row with probability 1
k
, we have (x′ · C)j ≤ ǫ. Note that y plays c with
probability at most 2
k
. Therefore, we have the following bound on the payoff of y against
x
′:
x
′ · C · y = yc · (x′ · C)c +
∑
j 6=c
yj · (x
′ · C)j
≤
2
k
+
∑
j 6=c
yj · ǫ
≤
2
k
+ ǫ.
Since the game is constant sum, this implies that the payoff of x′ against y is at least
1− ǫ− 2
k
. Therefore, the row player’s best response against y must also have payoff at
least 1− ǫ − 2
k
.
We now use the previous lemma to show that, provided that 2
k
< ǫ, the mixed strat-
egy profile (x,y) cannot be a (12 − ǫ)-Nash equilibrium.
LEMMA 3.2. If 2
k
< ǫ, then (x,y) is not a (12 − ǫ)-Nash equilibrium in (R,C).
PROOF. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that (x,y) is a (12 − ǫ)-Nash equilib-
rium in (R,C). By Lemma 3.1, the row player’s best response payoff against y is at
least 1− ǫ − 2
k
. Since, by assumption, the regret of the row player is at most 12 − ǫ, the
payoff of x against y must be at least:
(
1− ǫ−
2
k
)
−
(
1
2
− ǫ
)
=
1
2
−
2
k
.
Since the game is constant sum, this then implies that the payoff of y against x is at
most 12 +
2
k
. But, since the payoff of column c is always 1, the payoff of y against xmust
be at least 1− (12 − ǫ) =
1
2 + ǫ. Thus, we have a contradiction whenever
2
k
< ǫ.
Note that the precondition of Lemma 3.2 is equivalent to k > 2
ǫ
. Therefore this
lemma shows that, for every ǫ > 0, there exists a k′ such that, for all k ≥ k′ no deter-
ministic algorithm can find a (12 − ǫ)-Nash equilibrium in a k × k bimatrix game with
fewer than ǫ2 · k payoff queries. Thus, we have shown the following theorem, which is
the main result of this section.
THEOREM 3.3. The deterministic query complexity of finding a (12 − ǫ)-Nash equi-
librium is Ω(k2), even in zero-one constant-sum games.
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4. AN Ω(k2) LOWER BOUND AGAINST RANDOMIZED ALGORITHMS FOR FINDING 1
6k
-NASH
EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we show that no randomized algorithm can find a 16k -Nash equilibrium
while making o(k2) playoff queries, even in zero-one constant-sum games.
At a high level, our technique is similar to the one we used for our deterministic
lower bound in in Section 3: we will hide a column c such that Ci,c = 1 for all i ∈ [k]. In
this case however, instead of using an adversary, we use a probability distribution over
games. For each column j 6= c, we will select a single row rj uniformly at random, and
set Rrj ,j = 1 and Crj ,j = 0. For each row i 6= rj we will set Ri,j = 0 and Ci,j = 1. Thus,
in order to distinguish between column c, and a column j 6= c, the algorithm must find
the row rj , and as we will show, even randomized algorithms cannot do this in a query
efficient manner.
Formally, we define Gk to be a random distribution over zero-one constant-sum k× k
bimatrix games, defined in the following way. To draw a game from Gk, we first choose
a column c ∈ [k] uniformly at random, which will be referred to as the hidden column.
Furthermore, we choose r1, r2, . . . , rk to be k uniformly and independently chosen rows
(which may include repeats). Then we construct the game (R,C), where for all i, j ∈ [k]
we have:
Ci,j =


1 if j = c,
0 if j 6= c and rj = i,
1 otherwise.
We define Ri,j = 1− Ci,j for all i, j ∈ [k].
We show that if (x,y) is a strategy profile in which y does not assign strictly more
than 12 probability to the hidden column c, then (x,y) is not a
1
6k -Nash equilibrium.
Since y can assign strictly more than 12 probability to at most one column, this implies
that any algorithm that produces a 16k -Nash equilibrium must find the hidden column.
The following lemma shows that this property holds for all games in the support of the
distribution Gk.
LEMMA 4.1. Let (R,C) be a game drawn from Gk, where c is the hidden column. If
(x,y) is a 16k -Nash equilibrium in (R,C), then yc >
1
2 .
PROOF. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that (x,y) is a 16k -Nash equilibrium
in (R,C) and that yc ≤
1
2 . We begin by arguing that the row player’s best response
payoff against y is at least 12k . To see this, let x
′ be a row-player strategy that mixes
uniformly over all rows. Consider a column j 6= c, and observe that by construction,
column j contains exactly one 0 entry for the column player. Therefore, we have (C ·
x
′)j = 1 − 1k . Since y assigns at least
1
2 probability to columns other than c, we have
that the payoff of y against x′ is at most:
1
2
· 1 +
1
2
· (1−
1
k
) = 1−
1
2k
.
Since the game is constant-sum, this then implies that the payoff of x′ against y is at
least 12k .
Since the row player’s best response payoff against y must be at least 12k , and since
(x,y) is a 16k -Nash equilibrium, we have that the payoff of x against y is at least
1
3k .
Since the game is constant-sum, this then implies that the payoff of y against x is
at most 1 − 13k . However, since the column player can obtain a payoff of 1 by playing
column c, we have shown that the regret of y is strictly more than 16k , which provides
our contradiction.
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Recall that our goal is to show that even randomized algorithms cannot determine
if a column is the hidden column in a query efficient manner. In the next lemma, we
will formalise this idea. Suppose that our algorithm makes a series of randomized
queries. For each column j, we will use Aj to be an indicator variable for the event
“the algorithm did not find a row i such that Ci,j = 0”. Intuitively, if Aj = 1, then
the algorithm cannot rule out the possibility that column j is the hidden column. The
following lemma gives a simple bound on the probability of Aj .
LEMMA 4.2. Let (R,C) be a game drawn from Gk. Suppose that an algorithmmakes
f(k) queries in column j. We have:
Pr(Aj = 1) ≥ 1−
f(k)
k
.
PROOF. If j = c, then Pr(Aj = 1) = 1, and the lemma holds. Otherwise, since the
row rj was chosen uniformly at random, if we make f(k) queries in column j, then we
find rj with probability
f(k)
k
. Therefore Pr(Aj = 1) = 1−
f(k)
k
.
Note that, if f(k) ∈ o(k), then 1 − f(k)
k
tends to 1 as k tends to infinity. Thus we will
have Aj = 1 almost always, and j will be indistinguishable from c. In the following
lemma, we use this fact to show our lower bound. In particular, we show that no algo-
rithm that makes o(k2) payoff queries can succeed with a positive constant probability.
LEMMA 4.3. Let (R,C) be a game drawn from Gk. Any algorithm that makes o(k2)
payoff queries cannot find a 16k -Nash equilibrium of (R,C) with positive constant prob-
ability.
PROOF. Suppose that the algorithm makes at most g(k) ∈ o(k2) payoff queries and
outputs a mixed strategy profile (x,y). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that
(x,y) is a 16k -Nash equilibrium with probability 3 · δ, for constant δ ∈ (0,
1
3 ].
Note that at least k−δ·k columnsmust receive o(k) payoff queries, because otherwise
δ · k columns would receive Ω(k) payoff queries, giving Ω(k2) payoff queries in total.
Thus, there must exist a set S of columns, with |S| = k−δ ·k, and a function f(k) ∈ o(k),
such that each column in S received at most f(k) payoff queries.
Let S′ ⊆ S be the set of columns in S such that Aj = 1. Recall that, for each column j
in S′, the algorithm cannot distinguish between j and c. We now prove a lower bound
on the size of S′. By Lemma 4.2, we have that if j ∈ S, then E[Aj ] ≥ 1 −
f(k)
k
. Define
A =
∑
j∈S Aj , and note that by linearity of expectations we have:
E[A] ≥ (k − δ · k) · (1 −
f(k)
k
)
Since each of the events corresponding toAj are independent, we can apply Hoeffding’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(|A− E[A]| ≥ δ · k) ≤ 2 · exp(−
2 · (δ · k)2
k − δk
)
Thus, with probability at least 1− 2 · exp(− 2·(δ·k)
2
k−δk ) we have that S
′ contains at least
(k − δ · k) · (1−
f(k)
k
)− δ · k
columns.
Let us focus on the case where S′ contains at least this many columns. Note that y
can assign strictly more than 12 probability to at most one column in S
′, and therefore
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there are at least |S′| − 1 columns in S′ that are not assigned strictly more than 12
probability by y. Since c is chosen uniformly at random, and since the hidden column
could be any of the columns in S′, we have that yc ≤ 12 with probability at least:
(|S′| − 1) ·
1
k
=
(k − δ · k) · (1− f(k)
k
)− δ · k − 1
k
= (1 − δ) · (1−
f(k)
k
)− δ −
1
k
.
By Lemma 4.1, if yc ≤
1
2 , then (x,y) is not a
1
6k -Nash equilibrium.
In summary, we have that (x,y) is not a 16k -Nash equilibrium with probability at
least (
1− 2 · exp(−
2 · (δ · k)2
k − δk
)
)
·
(
(1− δ) · (1 −
f(k)
k
)− δ −
1
k
)
,
where the first term is the probability that S′ contains enough columns, and the second
term is the probability that yc ≤
1
2 . As k tends to infinity, we have that exp(−
2·(δ·k)2
k−δk )
tends to 0, and since f(k) ∈ o(k), we have that f(k)
k
tends to 0. Thus, the entire expres-
sion tends to 1− 2 · δ. Thus, for large k, the algorithm will fail with probability strictly
greater than 1 − 3 · δ, which contradicts our assumption that the algorithm succeeds
with probability at least 3 · δ.
Lemma 4.3 shows that every algorithm that makes o(k2) payoff queries on a game
drawn from Gk will fail to find a 16k -Nash equilibrium with probability tending to 1
as k tends to infinity. Moreover, recall that all games in Gk are zero-one constant-sum
games. Therefore, we have shown the following theorem, which is the main result of
this section.
THEOREM 4.4. The randomized query complexity of finding a 16k -Nash equilibrium
is Ω(k2), even in zero-one constant-sum games.
5. ZERO-SUM GAMES
We now turn our attention to showing upper bounds. In Sections 6 and 7, we will
give query efficient randomized algorithms for finding (3−
√
5
2 + ǫ)-Nash equilibria, and
(23 + ǫ)-WSNE, respectively. In this section, we give some preliminary results on zero-
sum games, which are required for our later results: the result in Section 6 requires us
to find an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game, and the result in Section 7 requires
us to find an ǫ-WSNE of a zero-sum game. In Section 5.1, we present the previous
work of Goldberg and Roth [Goldberg and Roth 2013], which provides a randomized
query-efficient algorithm for finding an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum game, and
in Section 5.2, we show how this can be converted into a randomized query-efficient
algorithm for finding an ǫ-WSNE in a zero-sum game.
Recall that we assumed that all bimatrix game payoffs lie in the range [0, 1]. The
two algorithms that we adapt both solve games that meet this assumption. In doing
so, both algorithms create and solve a derived zero-sum game with payoffs lying in the
range [−1, 1]. Thus, for the sake of convenience, during this section on zero-sum games,
we assume that all payoffs lie in the range [−1, 1].
5.1. A randomized algorithm for finding an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game
The following theorem, shown by Goldberg and Roth [Goldberg and Roth 2013] us-
ing using multiplicative weights updates no-regret algorithms, states that we have a
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randomized O(k·log k
ǫ2
) payoff query algorithm that finds an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in a
zero-sum game.
THEOREM 5.1 ([GOLDBERG AND ROTH 2013]). An ǫ-Nash equilibrium in a k × k
zero-sum bimatrix game can, with probability 1 − k−
1
8 , be computed using O(k·log k
ǫ2
)
payoff queries.
When we apply this result, we will also need to know the payoff vectors for both
players. We now give a randomized O(k·log k
ǫ2
) algorithm for discovering approximate
payoff vectors. Let (x,y) be a mixed strategy profile in a k×k bimatrix game (R,C). We
say that a k-dimensional vector r is an ǫ-approximate payoff vector for the row player
if, for each i ∈ [k], we have |ri−Ri ·y| ≤ ǫ. Similarly, we say that a k-dimensional vector
c is an ǫ-approximate payoff vector for the column player if, for each i ∈ [k], we have
|ci − (x ·C)i| ≤ ǫ. The following lemma shows that we can use a randomized algorithm
to find an ǫ-approximate payoff vector for the row player using O(k·log k
ǫ2
) payoff queries.
LEMMA 5.2. Let (x,y) be a mixed strategy profile in a k × k bimatrix game (R,C).
With probability at least 1 − 2
k
we can find an ǫ-approximate payoff vector for the row
player using O(k·log k
ǫ2
) payoff queries.
PROOF. We begin by giving a randomized method for finding the payoff of a fixed
row i ∈ [k] with probability 1 − 2
k2
using 8·ln k
ǫ2
many payoff queries. We will make T =
8·lnk
ǫ2
many payoff queries along row i, chosen according to the probability distribution
y. Let X1, X2, . . . , XT be the result of these queries, and define X =
1
T
(X1 +X2 + · · ·+
XT ). ApplyingHoeffding’s inequality, and noting that all payoffs lie in the range [−1, 1],
gives:
Pr(|X −Ri · yi| ≥ ǫ) ≤ 2 · exp(−
2 · T · ǫ2
(1 + 1)2
)
= 2 · exp(−2 · ln k)
=
2
k2
.
Thus, with probability 1− 2
k2
, we have that X is within ǫ of (R · y)i.
Now, to find an ǫ-approximation of the row player’s payoffs, we simply apply the
above method separately for each row i ∈ [k]. Clearly, this will use O(k·ln k
ǫ2
) many
payoff queries. The probability that we correctly compute an ǫ-approximation of the
row player’s payoffs is:
(
1−
2
k2
)k
≥ 1−
(
k
1
)
·
2
k2
= 1−
2
k
.
This completes the proof.
Note that, since we can swap the roles of the two players, Lemma 5.2 can also be used
to find an ǫ-approximate payoff vector for the column player. Combining Lemma 5.2
with Theorem 5.1 gives the following corollary.
COROLLARY 5.3. Given a k × k zero-sum bimatrix game, with probability at least
(1 − k−
1
8 )(1 − 2
k
)2, we can compute an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (x,y), and ǫ-approximate
payoff vectors for both players under (x,y), using O(k·log k
ǫ2
) payoff queries.
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We now introduce further notation for working with approximate payoff vectors.
Let (x,y) be a mixed strategy profile in a bimatrix game (R,C). Let r and c be ǫ-
approximate payoff vectors for the row and column player, respectively. We say that a
row i is a best response according to r if ri = maxj∈[k] rj , and that a column i is a best
response according to c if ci = maxj∈[k] cj . We will frequently use the fact that, if i is a
best response according to r, and if i′ is an actual best response against y, then:
|ri −Ri′ · y| ≤ ǫ. (1)
This is because, if ri > Ri′ · y + ǫ, then Ri · y > Ri′ · y, which would contradict the fact
that i′ is a best response, and if ri < Ri′ ·y+ ǫ then ri < ri′ , which would contradict the
fact that i is a best response according to r. If row i is a best response according to r,
then we define the row player’s regret according to r to be ri−x · r. Similarly, if column
i a best response according to c, then we define the regret according to c to be ci− c ·y.
Note that, if i is an actual best response against y, then we have:
|(r − x · r)− (Ri · y − x · R · y)| ≤ 2ǫ.
In other words, the regret according to r is within 2ǫ of the actual regret suffered by
the row player under (x,y).
5.2. A randomized algorithm for finding an ǫ-WSNE of a zero-sum game
In this section, we give a randomized query efficient algorithm for finding approximate
well-supportedNash equilibria in zero-sum games. Our approach is to first compute an
approximate Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game using Corollary 5.3, and to then
convert this into an ǫ-WSNE for the zero-sum game. Chen, Deng, and Teng have given
an algorithm (henceforth referred to as the CDT algorithm) that takes a ǫ
2
8 -Nash equi-
librium of a game, and in polynomial-time finds an ǫ-WSNE for that game [Chen et al.
2009]. However, their method requires that we know the payoff of every pure strategy
in the ǫ
2
8 -Nash equilibrium. In our setting, we only know approximate payoff vectors
for both players, so the CDT algorithm cannot be directly applied. In the next lemma,
we show a variant of their result, which can be applied when we only know approxi-
mate payoff vectors.
LEMMA 5.4. Let (R,C) be a bimatrix game, let (x,y) be an ǫ
2
24 -Nash equilibrium of
(R,C), and let r and c be ǫ
2
24 -approximate payoff vectors for the row and column player
under (x,y). Without making any payoff queries, we can construct an ǫ-WSNE of (R,C).
PROOF. Let i∗ be an actual best response against y, and let j∗ be a best response
according to r. We define the set B = {j : rj∗ > rj +
ǫ
4}, and our first task is to show
that B contains every row j that is not a ǫ2 -best response against y.
Note that |rj∗ −Ri∗ · y| ≤
ǫ2
24 . Furthermore, note that for every row j we have:
Ri∗ · y −Rj · y ≤ rj∗ − rj +
ǫ2
12
.
Therefore, if row j satisfies rj∗ ≤ rj +
ǫ
4 then:
Ri∗ · y −Rj · y ≤
ǫ
4
+
ǫ2
12
≤
ǫ
2
.
This implies that j is an ǫ2 -best response against y. So, the set B must contain every
row j that is not an ǫ2 -best response against y.
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Define the random variable Y = Ri∗ · y − x · R · y and the random variable X =
rj∗ − x · rj . Note that, since x is a
ǫ2
24 -Nash equilibrium, we know that the row player
suffers regret at most ǫ
2
24 under (x,y), and therefore we have E[Y ] ≤
ǫ2
24 . Furthermore,
since X is the regret according to r, we know that:
E[X ] ≤ E[Y ] +
ǫ2
12
=
ǫ2
8
.
By applying Markov’s inequality, we obtain:
Pr(X ≥
ǫ
4
) ≤
ǫ2
8
/
ǫ
4
=
ǫ
2
.
Therefore, x must assign at most ǫ2 probability to rows in B. We define x
′ to be a
modification of x where all probability assigned to rows in B is is shifted arbitrarily to
rows that are not in B.
Now consider the column player. If we define B′ = {i : ci∗ > ci + ǫ4}, then we can
use the same argument as above to prove that B′ contains every column that is not a
ǫ
2 -best response against x, and that the column player assigns at most
ǫ
2 probability to
the columns in B′. Similarly, we define y′ to be a modification of y where all probability
assigned to columns in B′ is shifted arbitrarily to columns not in B′.
Note that every row in Supp(x′) is a ǫ2 -best response against y. Since y
′ differs from
y by a shift of at most ǫ2 probability, we have that every row in Supp(x
′) is an ǫ-best re-
sponse against y′. Using the same technique, we can argue that every row in Supp(y′)
is an ǫ-best response against x′, and therefore (x′,y′) is an ǫ-WSNE.
By using the reduction from Lemma 5.4, it is now easy to see that we can compute
an ǫ-WSNE of a zero-sum bimatrix game. The following corollary is a combination of
Corollary 5.3 and Lemma 5.4.
COROLLARY 5.5. Given a k × k zero-sum bimatrix game, with probability at least
(1− k−
1
8 )(1 − 2
k
)2, we can compute an ǫ-WSNE (x,y) using O(k·log k
ǫ4
) payoff queries.
6. A RANDOMIZED ALGORITHM FOR FINDING A ( 3−
√
5
2
+ ǫ)-NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we present a randomized payoff-query efficient algorithm for finding
a (3−
√
5
2 + ǫ)-Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game, where
3−√5
2 ≈ 0.38197. We adapt
an algorithm of Bosse, Byrka, and Markakis [Bosse et al. 2010] (henceforth referred to
as the BBM algorithm) for finding a (3−
√
5
2 + ǫ)-Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game.
The BBM algorithm solves a zero-sum game, and then makes a decision based on the
regret suffered by the players. We must adapt the algorithm to work with approximate
payoff vectors.
Let (R,C) be a k × k bimatrix game, and define D = R − C. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be a
parameter that will be fixed later. The algorithm is as follows.
(1) Apply Theorem 5.1 for ǫ4 to the game (D,−D) in order to obtain (x,y), which is a
ǫ
4 -Nash equilibrium. Then apply Lemma 5.2 in order to find r and c, which are
ǫ
4 -
approximate payoff vectors for when (x,y) is played in the game (R,C). This step
succeeds with probability (1− k−
1
8 )(1− 2
k
)2 and uses O(k·log k
ǫ2
) payoff queries.
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(2) We will assume, without loss of generality, that the regret according to r is larger
than the regret according to c. Let row b be a best response according to r in the
game (R,C), and let g be the regret according to r. Since b and g are determined by
r, this step requires no payoff queries.
(3) Let d be a best response for the column player against row b in the game (R,C).
This can be found using k payoff queries, by querying every column in row b.
(4) If g ≤ α, then output (x,y). Otherwise, let δ = 1−g2−g and output the following strat-
egy, denoted as (xˆ, yˆ): the row player plays b as a pure strategy, and the column
player plays y with probability (1 − δ) and d with probability δ. This step uses no
payoff queries.
The following lemma shows that this algorithm is correct, in the case Theorem 5.1
succeeds in finding an approximate Nash equilibrium of (D,−D), and Lemma 5.2 suc-
ceeds in finding the approximate payoff vectors in (R,C).
LEMMA 6.1. If (x,y) is a ǫ4 -Nash equilibrium of (D,−D), and r and c are
ǫ
4 -approximate payoff vectors for (x,y) in (R,C), then the algorithm outputs a
(max(α, 1−α2−α ) + ǫ)-Nash equilibrium of (R,C).
PROOF. First consider the case where g ≤ α. Let i be a best response for the row
player against y. By applying Equation (1), we can obtain the following bound on the
row player’s regret:
Ri · y − x ·R · y ≤ rb − x · r+
ǫ
2
= g +
ǫ
2
≤ α+
ǫ
2
Thus, the row player’s regret at most α + ǫ2 under (x,y). Since, by assumption, the
regret according to c is at most g, we can use the same argument to prove that the
column player’s regret is at most α+ ǫ2 . Therefore, (x,y) is a (α+
ǫ
2 )-Nash equilibrium.
We now consider the case where g > α. We first consider the row player. Let bˆ be a
best response against yˆ. The row player’s regret in (xˆ, yˆ) is:
R
bˆ
· yˆ −Rb · yˆ = (1− δ)(Rbˆ · y −Rb · y) + δ · (Rbˆ,d −Rb,d)
≤ (1− δ)(r
bˆ
− rb +
ǫ
2
) + δ · (R
bˆ,d
−Rb,d)
≤ (1− δ) ·
ǫ
2
+ δ · (R
bˆ,d
−Rb,d)
≤
ǫ
2
+ δ.
The first inequality holds because r is is an ǫ4 -approximate payoff vector against y.
The second inequality holds because b = maxi∈[k] ri. The third inequality holds because
1− δ ≤ 1 and Ri,j ∈ [0, 1] for all i and j.
So, we have shown that the row player’s regret is at most
δ +
ǫ
2
=
1− g
2− g
+
ǫ
2
≤
1− α
2− α
+
ǫ
2
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The inequality above holds because 1−g2−g is a decreasing function when g ≤ 1, and
because g > α.
We now consider the column player. Since (x,y) is an ǫ4 -Nash equilibrium of (D,−D),
the row player’s regret under (x,y) in (D,−D)must be at most ǫ4 . Thus, all rows imust
satisfy Di · y ≤ x ·D · y +
ǫ
4 . Applying this inequality for row b gives the following:
Db · y ≤ x ·D · y +
ǫ
4
(R− C)b · y ≤ x · (R− C) · y +
ǫ
4
Rb · y − x · R · y + x · C · y −
ǫ
4
≤ Cb · y (2)
Since r is a ǫ4 -approximate payoff vector we have:
Rb · y − x ·R · y ≥ rb − x · r−
ǫ
2
= g −
ǫ
2
Substituting this into Equation (2)
Cb · y ≥ g + x · C · y −
3
4
ǫ
≥ g − ǫ (3)
Recall that d is an actual best response against b for the column player. Since xˆ
plays b as a pure strategy, we have therefore have that d is a best response against xˆ.
Moreover, observe that
(1− δ)(1 − g) =
(1 − g)(2− g) + (1− g)2
2− g
=
1− g
2− g
. (4)
Thus, the column player’s regret when playing yˆ against xˆ is:
(xˆ · C)d − xˆ · C · yˆ = Cb,d − Cb · yˆ
= Cb,d − ((1− δ) · Cb · y + δ · Cb,d)
= (1− δ)(Cb,d − Cb · y)
≤ (1− δ)(1 − g + ǫ) [By Equation (3)]
≤
1− g
2− g
+ ǫ [By Equation (4)]
<
1− α
2− α
+ ǫ.
We have now shown that, in the case where g > α, both players have regret at most
1−α
2−α + ǫ, which implies that (xˆ, yˆ) is a (
1−α
2−α + ǫ)-Nash equilibrium.
As shown by Bosse, Byrka, and Markakis, we have that the expression max(α, 1−α2−α )
is minimized when α = 3−
√
5
2 ≈ 0.38197. Thus, we have the following theorem.
THEOREM 6.2. Given a k× k bimatrix game, with probability at least (1− k−
1
8 )(1−
2
k
)2, we can compute a (3−
√
5
2 + ǫ)-Nash equilibrium using O(
k·log k
ǫ2
) payoff queries.
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7. A RANDOMIZED ALGORITHM FOR FINDING FINDING A ( 2
3
+ ǫ)-WELL-SUPPORTED NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we give a randomized O(k·log k
ǫ4
) payoff query algorithm for finding a
(23 + ǫ)-WSNE equilibrium in a bimatrix game, and we give a randomized O(
k·log k
ǫ4
)
payoff query algorithm for finding a (12 + ǫ)-WSNE in a zero-one bimatrix game. We
follow the algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis (henceforth referred to as the KS al-
gorithm) for finding a 23 -WSNE in a bimatrix game [Kontogiannis and Spirakis 2010].
Their approach can be summarised as follows: they first perform a preprocessing step
in which they check whether the game has a pure 23 -WSNE. If it does not, then they
construct a zero-sum game and compute an exact Nash equilibrium for it. They show
that, if the original game does not have a pure 23 -WSNE, then an exact Nash equilib-
rium in the zero-sum game is a 23 -WSNE in the original game.
There are two problems with this approach in the payoff query setting. Firstly, it
has been shown that finding an exact Nash equilibrium of a k × k zero-sum game
requires k2 queries [Fearnley et al. 2013]. To solve this problem, we substitute an ǫ-
WSNE of the zero-sum game in place of an exact Nash equilibrium, and we show
that, after this substitution, the KS algorithm will still produce a well-supported Nash
equilibrium of the original game. The second problem is that we are unable to perform
the preprocessing step in a query-efficient manner. A naive algorithm would require
k2 payoff queries in order to verify whether there is a pure 23 -WSNE, and it is not clear
how this can be improved. To solve this problem, we show that the preprocessing step
does not need to be carried out before the zero-sum game has been solved. Instead,
we find an ǫ-WSNE in the zero-sum game, and then check whether it is a 23 -WSNE in
the original. If it is not, then we show how this information can be used to find a pure
(23 + ǫ)-WSNE in the original game.
Let (R,C) be a bimatrix game, where R is the payoff matrix of the row player, and C
is the payoff matrix of the column player. The KS algorithm uses the following defini-
tions.
D :=
1
2
(R− C) X := −
1
2
(R + C)
Observe that D = R + X . The KS algorithm finds an exact Nash equilibrium of the
zero-sum game (D,−D). In contrast to this, we do the following:
—we will apply Corollary 5.5 to (D,−D) to obtain an ǫ10 -WSNE for (D,−D), which we
denote as (x,y).
—We then obtain approximate payoff vectors for when (x,y) is played in (R,C): we
apply Lemma 5.2 to obtain ǫ10 -approximate payoff vectors r, which approximates
R · y, and c, which approximates x · C.
These two steps succeed with probability at least (1 − k−
1
8 )(1 − 2
k
)3. We will fix (x,y),
r, and c for the rest of this section.
In the following lemma, we show how the preprocessing of the KS algorithm can be
delayed until after the zero-sum game has been solved. In particular, we show that if
there is a row in the support of x that is far from being an approximate best response,
then, in a query-efficient manner, we can find a pure strategy profile i, j ∈ [k] such
that (R+C)i,j is large. The parameter z will allow us to apply this lemma for both the
zero-one and general bimatrix games: in the zero-one case we will set z = 0.5, and for
general bimatrix games we will set z = 23 .
LEMMA 7.1. Let z ∈ [0, 1]. If there is an i′ ∈ Supp(x) and i ∈ [k] such that ri >
ri′ +z−
ǫ
5 , then using k payoff queries, we can find a j ∈ [k] such that (R+C)i,j > 2z− ǫ.
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PROOF. Since r is an ǫ10 -approximate payoff vector for the row player, and since
ri > ri′ + z −
ǫ
5 we have:
Ri · y > Ri′ · y + z −
2
5
ǫ. (5)
Since x is an ǫ10 -WSNE in (D,−D), and since i
′ ∈ Supp(x) by assumption, we have:
Di′ · y ≥ Di · y −
ǫ
10
(R+X)i′ · y ≥ (R +X)i · y −
ǫ
10
Ri′ · y ≥ Ri · y − (Xi′ −Xi) · y −
ǫ
10
.
Combining this with Equation (5) yields:
Ri′ · y > Ri′ · y + z −
2ǫ
5
− (Xi′ −Xi) · y −
ǫ
10
(Xi′ −Xi) · y > z −
ǫ
2
.
Since X = − 12 (R + C), we have that Xi′ · y ∈ [−1, 0] and hence Xi′ · y ≤ 0. Therefore,
we have:
−Xi · y > z −
ǫ
2
1
2
(R+ C)i · y > z −
ǫ
2
(R+ C)i · y > 2z − ǫ.
In order for this inequality to hold, there must be at least one column j such that
(R+C)i,j > 2z−ǫ. Since we know row i, we can find column j using k payoff queries.
Note that, by swapping the roles of the two players, Lemma 7.1 can also be applied
for the column player. We can now prove the main result of this section.
THEOREM 7.2. Let (R,C) be a k × k bimatrix game. With probability at least (1 −
k−
1
8 )(1− 2
k
)3 and using O(k·log k
ǫ4
) we can compute a (23 + ǫ)-WSNE if (R,C) is a general
bimatrix game, or a (12 + ǫ)-WSNE if (R,C) is a zero-one bimatrix game.
PROOF. As we have described, the algorithm spends O(k·log k
ǫ4
) in order to compute
(x,y), r, and c. We first prove the result for general bimatrix games.
Observe that, since since r is an ǫ10 -approximate payoff vector, if we have ri ≤ ri′ +
2
3 −
ǫ
5 for two rows i, i
′ ∈ [k], then we have Ri · y ≤ Ri′ + 23 . So, our algorithm will check
whether:
— ri ≤ ri′ +
2
3 −
ǫ
5 for every i ∈ [k] and every i
′ ∈ Supp(x), and
— ci ≤ ci′ +
2
3 −
ǫ
5 for every i ∈ [k] and every i
′ ∈ Supp(y).
If both of these checks succeed, then (x,y) is a 23 -WSNE in (R,C), and we are done. On
the other hand, if either of the two checks fail, then we can apply Lemma 7.1 to obtain
a pair i, j ∈ [k] such that (R + C)i,j >
4
3 − ǫ. This implies that both Ri,j >
1
3 − ǫ and
Ci,j >
1
3 − ǫ, and therefore i and j form a pure (
2
3 + ǫ)-WSNE.
For zero-one games, the proof is similar. The algorithm will check whether ri ≤
ri′ +(
1
2 + ǫ)−
ǫ
5 for every i ∈ [k] and every i
′ ∈ Supp(x), and whether ci ≤ ci′ +(12 + ǫ)−
ǫ
5
for every i ∈ [k] and every i′ ∈ Supp(y). If both of these checks succeed, then we have
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that (x,y) is a (12 + ǫ)-WSNE. Otherwise, we can apply Lemma 7.1 to obtain a pair
i, j ∈ [k] such that (R + C)i,j > 1 + 2ǫ − ǫ > 1. However, since this is a zero-one game,
the only way to have (R + C)i,j > 1 is if Ri,j = 1 and Ci,j = 1. Therefore (i, j) is a pure
Nash equilibrium.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have given a complete characterization of the deterministic query
complexity of ǫ-Nash equilibria for constant ǫ, we have given randomized upper bounds
for both ǫ-Nash equilibria and ǫ-WSNE, and we have initiated work on lower bounds
against randomized algorithms for finding ǫ-Nash equilibria.
There are many open problems arising from this work. In addition to ruling out
query-efficient randomized algorithms for finding exact Nash equilibria, our lower
bound in Section 4 also rules out query efficient algorithms for finding 16k -Nash equi-
libria in k × k bimatrix games. The most obvious open problem stemming from this
is to prove a lower bound for randomized algorithms for constant approximations. At
the very least, it would be desirable to have matching Ω(k · log k) lower bounds for our
algorithms in Sections 6 and 7. Also, does there exist a constant ǫ < 3−
√
5
2 for which
the randomized query complexity is ω(k · log k), or a constant ǫ < 23 for which the
randomized query complexity of finding an ǫ-WSNE is ω(k · log k)?
Our result in Section 3 completes the characterization of the deterministic query
complexity for ǫ-Nash equilibria for constant ǫ, but we do not have such a characteri-
zation for ǫ-WSNE. Of course, since every ǫ-WSNE is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, the lower
bound of Section 3 applies for ǫ < 12 , but we do not know much about the determinis-
tic query complexity of ǫ-WSNE with ǫ ≥ 12 . One easy initial observation on this topic
is the following lemma, proved in Appendix A, which shows that for every ǫ < 1, the
deterministic query complexity of finding an ǫ-WSNE is Ω(k). It has been shown that
we can always find a (1 − 1
k
)-Nash equilibrium using no queries at all [Fearnley et al.
2013], so this lemma shows that we should expect ǫ-WSNE to behave differently to
ǫ-Nash equilibria when ǫ > 12 .
LEMMA 8.1. For every ǫ < 1, the deterministic query complexity of finding an ǫ-
WSNE in a k × k bimatrix game is at least k − 1, even in zero-one games.
In Sections 6 and 7, we adapt two polynomial-time approximation algorithms to
give randomized query-efficient protocols. However, in both cases, we do not use the
best possible polynomial-time approximations. There is a polynomial time algorithm
that finds a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium [Tsaknakis and Spirakis 2008] using a gradient
descent method, but it is not at all clear how this method could be implemented in a
query efficient manner. For WSNE, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for finding
a (23 − 0.004735)-WSNE [Fearnley et al. 2012], which uses an exhaustive search of all
2 × 2 supports in order to improve the KS-algorithm. Even if this search could be
implemented in a query efficient manner, this would only give a tiny improvement
over our result in Section 7.
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A. A LINEAR LOWER BOUND FOR FINDING ǫ-WSNE WHEN ǫ < 1
In this section, we show a linear lower bound for finding any non-trivial well-supported
Nash equilibrium in a zero-one game. More precisely, we will show that, for any ǫ < 1,
all algorithms must make at least k− 1 payoff queries in order to find an ǫ-WSNE in a
k × k bimatrix game.
To prove our result, we will assume that all payoff queries return payoff 0 for both
the row and column player. We will show that, when all queries are responded to in
this way, all algorithms must make at least k − 1 payoff queries in order to correctly
determine an ǫ-WSNE. We first show the following lemma.
LEMMA A.1. Let (x,y) be a ǫ-WSNE. Let r be a row that is played with probability
strictly less than 1 in x. At most ǫ probability can be assigned to columns in r that have
not been queried.
PROOF. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that x assigns strictly
more than ǫ probability to unqueried columns in r. Let U = {c :
(r, c) did not receive a payoff query}. We construct a row player payoff matrix R as fol-
lows:
Ri,j =
{
1 if i = r and j ∈ U ,
0 otherwise.
This matrix is consistent with all payoff queries that have been made so far. Since
x assigns strictly more than ǫ probability to the columns in U , the payoff of row r is
strictly greater than ǫ. Moreover, the payoff of every row i 6= r is 0. Since r is not played
with probability 1 by x, some probability must be assigned to a row r′ with payoff 0.
Therefore, we have:
Rr′ · y −Rr · y > ǫ− 0.
This proves that row r is not an ǫ-best response against y, which provides our contra-
diction.
Having shown Lemma A.1, we can now provide the proof of Lemma 8.1.
PROOF OF LEMMA 8.1. Let (x,y) be an ǫ-WSNE. Let W be the set of rows that
are not played with probability 1 by x. Note that W contains at least k − 1 rows. By
Lemma A.1, in each row in W , there must be at least 1 − ǫ probability assigned to
queried columns. Since ǫ < 1, this implies that each row in W must have at least one
queried column, which implies that we must have made at least k − 1 queries.
